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Abstract—This paper presents an approach to measuring
computer security understood as a system property, in the
category of similar properties, such as safety, reliability,
dependability, resilience, etc. First, a historical discussion of
measurements is presented, beginning with views of Hermann
von Helmholtz in his 19-th century work “Zählen und Messen”.
Then, contemporary approaches related to the principles of
measuring software properties are discussed, with emphasis on
statistical, physical and software models. A distinction between
metrics and measures is made to clarify the concepts. A brief
overview of inadequacies of methods and techniques to
evaluate computer security is presented, followed by a proposal
and discussion of a practical model to conduct experimental
security measurements.
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vague as the one applied by Henry I to defining the unit of
length. In this view, the rest of the paper is devoted to
clarification of basic concepts of measurement and how they
can be applied to building a model of security as a system
property that could be used to measuring security.

I. INTRODUCTION

W

HEN Henry I, the King of England, decreed in the
first half of the XII-th century that a yard shall be
“the distance from the tip of the King’s nose to the end of
his outstretched thumb”, neither he nor any of his subjects
realized that the first standard of measuring length was
introduced over the ages [1]. The standard of measuring
length (distance) has significantly evolved, from the ancient
Egyptian cubit to the one based on physical properties, as
captured in a diagram presented in Figure 1.
The current definition of the standard unit of length, a
meter, involves the speed of light and reads as follows [2]:
“the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a
time interval of 1/299,792,458 of a second.” The historical
evolution of the humankind’s understanding of the unit of
length, pictured in Figure 1, shows an amazing path, which
led us from a very vague concept to an extremely precise
definition based on the speed of light, we have now. It must
be noticed, however, that it took us nearly 800 years to
straighten the concept, which we now take for granted.
It is the conjecture of this paper that at current stage of
understanding how to measure security as a system property,
we are at the point comparable to the early days of
attempting to measure length. All methods we have are as
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Fig. 1 Evolution of the concept of unit of length [1]
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II. WHAT IS A MEASUREMENT?
A. Hermann von Helmholtz Concept of Measurement
Although there are several concepts of measurement, they
all seem to converge to the idea formulated in the 19-th
century by Herman von Helmholtz, in his groundbreaking
work “Zählen und Messen” [3], in which Helmholtz says:
“The special relation which can exist between the
attributes of two objects and which is designated
by us by the name equality is characterized by […]
Axiom I: If two magnitudes are equal to a third,
they are equal to each other.”
This statement, which may seem trivial from today’s
perspective, actually is very constructive and quite distinctly
sets the stage for conducting measurements in a way that it
determines the following:
 a property (called an attribute) of a object to be
measured;
 a standard, that is, in Helmholtz’ words, the third
magnitude, to which others are compared; and
 an existence of a procedure used to make the
comparisons between magnitudes.
This procedure is further characterized by von Helmholtz
in the same work, as follows:
”The procedure by which we put the two objects
under proper conditions in order to observe the
stated result and to be able to establish its
occurrence or its non-occurrence, we shall
designate as the method of comparison.”
Defining measurement procedure as a method of
comparison, von Helmholtz gives several examples of
physical quantities that can be measured, by comparison
with a standard, including distance, time, brightness, pitch of
tone and weight, measured with the use of scales, for which
he explains the measurement principle further:
“… the bodies the weights of which we compare
can consist of the most different materials and can
be of different form and volume. The weight
which we call equal is only an attribute of these
bodies discriminated by abstraction.”
To summarize, the contribution of von Helmholtz was to
make a clear distinction between three factors necessary for
a measurement to make sense: a property to be measured, a
standard against which comparisons are made, and a
procedure to determine how exactly make the comparisons.
In modern terms, the standard can be viewed as a metric,
and measurement procedure relates to a measure, that is,
measuring instrument.
Overall, von Helmholtz’ contribution to measurement
theory is much broader than that, and as one of the
investigators of his work states, “Zählen und Messen” is
“commonly regarded as a turning point between an older
concept of measurement in which quantity precedes number
and the present concept in which quantity and number are
defined separately” [4].

B. Statistical Approach to Measurements
The contribution of von Helmholtz is significant, in terms
of the logic of measurement and the associated theory.
However, without questioning his work, newer theories treat
the measurement processes as statistical in nature. The
principal assumption of the statistical approach to
measurements is that due to the inherent uncertainties in the
measurement process, the result of a measurement always
consists of two numbers: the value of the measured quantity
and the estimation of the measurement uncertainty with
which this value has been obtained (error).
With this view, it is easy to recognize that even the most
common notion of measuring time results in two values.
When we ask “What time is it?”, we obtain a single value,
say, 5:30pm, which just happens to be indicated on a watch,
but with an implicit understanding that the accuracy of this
time value is one minute.
To illustrate the significance of the implications of this
concept, one can show an apparently trivial example of
measuring the resistance of a DC battery [5]. With a simple
battery model consisting of an ideal battery (with zero
resistance) and an ideal resistor connected to it in series, the
actual measurement circuit will need to have several sources
of noise, representing uncertainty. In particular, given some
simplifying assumptions, such as linear and time-invariant
circuits and neglecting temperature effects, among the
factors that cannot be ignored are the following:
 noise caused by battery voltage fluctuations and
thermal effects from the resistor
 noise from the voltmeter used in the measurement
and its calibration error
 load resistance, including input impedance of the
voltmeter.
Combining all these factors leads to a rather significant
complication in calculating the battery resistance, making it
a non-linear computation of what looked like a simple
application of Ohm’s Law. Consequently, taking into
account uncertainties in the measurement process turns out
to be crucial in providing the quality of measurement values.
C. Lessons from Measurements in Physics
To help realize the challenge of measuring properties, one
can look closer at the extreme of measuring strictly physical
properties (quantities). In addition to length, mentioned
above, among physical properties we are most familiar with
are time and mass.
The current definition of a second, a metric (unit) of time,
involves atomic radiation and reads as follows [2]: “the
duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of the radiation
corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine
levels of the ground state of the cesium 133 atom.” It must
be noticed that this definition, just like the one of a unit of
length, quoted in Section I, evolved historically from much
less precise definitions and understanding of respective
quantities. A historical background can be found at [2].
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The metric of mass (its unit), a kilogram, is currently the
only physical unit that officially remains defined based on a
physical artifact, an international prototype stored in the
International Bureau of Weights and Measures, near Paris.
However, there is a substantial push towards defining it
more precisely, using the number of atoms in a silicon 28
crystal [6]. Developing this new definition has not been fully
successful, yet, but (in the context of considering definition
of security) it is worth mentioning, why this is so: “The
measurement uncertainty is 1.5 higher than that targeted for
a kilogram redefinition […]. The measurement accuracy
seems to be limited by the working apparatuses.” Clearly,
any measurement of security must involve the use of
measuring devices and assessment of their accuracy.
It may be further argued that security is not a physical
property and cannot be measured directly, so even
considering such measurements would make little or no
sense.
In physics, however, there are examples of
quantities, which do not measure directly certain properties
of matter. One such prominent example is temperature,
which is essentially a quantity corresponding to and
measuring kinetic energy.
It is clear from these lessons that several points have to be
taken into consideration, if one is to develop scientifically
based security measurements:
 the process of designing a validated metric of
security may take years, if not decades;
 any measures of security must be treated as (physical
or mental) measurement devices (instruments), to
which regular statistical measurement theory applies
 security is likely to be measured only indirectly,
possibly via its inherent components.
D. Software Measurements
With all that has been said in the subsections above,
software measurements cause a particular challenge. First of
all, software is not a physical quantity, so the question arises
can we really distinguish some meaningful software
attributes that would have significance regarding the
estimation of software quality? In other words, “Analogous
to physics, there is the idea whether we can compare a
software quality attribute to a norm” [7].
This dilemma has been resolved in two ways. First, we
apply a concept of a latent variable, to represent a property
that cannot be measured directly but can be estimated using
observable attributes (or respective variables representing
them) [7]. Second, being aware of our imperfection in
approaching the measurements of software, similarly to the
evolution of a concept of measuring length and time, we
relax the requirement about ultimate quality of software
measurements by adopting the rule: “For software then, like
time, we want measures that are practical and that we expect
will evolve over time to meet the need of the day” [8].
The first publication adopting concepts of measurement
theory to software measurements, and comparing them,
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appears to be [9]. Among the major factors that attention
should be paid to in software measurements, the authors list
uncertainty of the measurement, stating that “improvements
in the maturity of software engineering as a truly
engineering discipline require for software measurements to
include the evaluation of measurements uncertainty
whenever measurement results are expressed” [9].
However, they further apply measurement concepts to the
function-point analysis, which is a method estimating
development effort not the quality of software itself.
III. CAN SECURITY BE MEASURED?
A. Overview
There have been numerous publications in the last decade
on security assessment, including books [10-11], research
and engineering papers [12-13], government reports [14-16],
and Internet sources [17-18], all of them discussing security
metrics. However, a vast majority of them deal with metrics
at the management level and have very little to do with
measurement in a scientific sense of the term, as developed
in measurement theory [5,7-8].
What is meant by security metrics in these publications is
primarily adherence to standards, whether established
industry standards [19-21] or internal company standards
[22-23], leading to the assessment of how security policies
are executed, for example, by implementing respective
processes and auditing them. As one paper defines it [24],
security metrics mean “the measurement of the effectiveness
of the organization’s security efforts over time.” While this
way of security assessment is beneficial and productive,
measuring security as a property of a computing system or
software is not particularly well developed.
What is of specific interest in the current paper is not
security at the enterprise or the organization level, but rather
how security as a computer system property or software
property can contribute to protecting information and other
resources during system’s operation. In this regard, security
can be viewed as one specific aspect of system’s
dependability, the other two aspects being safety and
reliability, with one of the earliest papers addressing this
issue published over twenty years ago [25].
Such focus on quantitative assessment of operational
aspects of security has become more popular in recent years.
A thorough survey has been published in 2009 [26],
covering quantitative representation and analysis of
operational security since 1981, and addressing the question
whether “security can correctly be represented with
quantitative information?” The major finding of this study
was that “there exists significant work for quantified
security, but there is little solid evidence that the methods
represent security in operational settings.” This brings us to
the question “Is security measurable?” Before that, it would
be even more important to answer a more fundamental
question: “Why do we measure?”
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B. Why Do We Measure?
There is an often quoted and famous statement by Lord
Kelvin [27] that “when you can measure what you are
speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know
something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when
you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a
meagre and unsatisfactory kind”. Similar motivations
guided generations of physicists who gave us all the
discoveries thanks to which we are now able to define the
basic metrics of physical quantities so precisely. Despite a
different nature of software, which is not a material entity,
this view of measurement can be also pursued.
Software engineering, being a young discipline, does not
have its Lord Kelvin, yet, but one name is certainly worth
mentioning. Watts Humphrey deserves quoting, having said
[28] that “quality management is impossible without quality
measures and quality data. As long as software people try to
improve quality without measuring and managing quality,
they will make little or no progress.” This is the main
premise why measurements are critical for any software
controlled system. Introduction of rigorous processes based
on measurements allows software organizations improve
their products, reaching higher capability maturity levels.
For a complete picture, it is worthwhile including a
comment from an electrical engineer, published in a systems
engineering magazine [29]. After outlining significant
deficiencies in current approaches to security and pointing to
successes of engineering disciplines, which base their
designs on scientific measurements, Fred Cohen writes:
“As systems engineers, it would be nice to be able
to use the same sorts of notions of design for
information security as we use for other sorts of
design. It would be nice to be able to have standard
units of measurement against which we could test
things. It would be nice to be able to develop tools
for measurement that could be calibrated against
the standards, to have a theoretical basis for
developing a mathematics and testing it, and then
to be able to build up a systems engineering
approach to information security like we do in
other engineering ﬁelds. But ﬁrst, we need to be
able to make meaningful measurements.”
With these three sample views, coming from a physicist, a
software engineer and an electrical/systems engineer, it
becomes quite obvious that the measurements are necessary
to improve decision making. In engineering, we have to say
it even more strongly, that we measure properties to receive
adequate information to determine system’s behavior and be
able to better control system’s parameters. Thus, what has
been also expressed in the most recent security research
quite clearly [16,30-31], we want to measure security to
predict system’s behavior and better respond to potential
threats or, at least, estimate the associated risks. As one
author stated it rather bluntly [32]: “And until we can
measure security, we can’t improve it.”

C. Measurable or Not?
As the quoted author stated in [32], and several other
publications expressed as well [33-36], there are significant
concerns about the feasibility of security assessment, with
some authors even arguing that security as a system property
is not measurable [37-38]. In particular, [38] presents a
view that any security metric must be a computable function
mapping a set of features of systems, subject to security
concerns, into the real numbers. Under this assumption,
introducing a system model with an owner, its adversaries,
and an observer, it is claimed that security is nonmeasurable for the combination of the following three
reasons:
 the set of unmitigated weaknesses (vulnerabilities) is
not measurable by anyone, including the owner of
the system;
 the set of weaknesses (vulnerabilities) known to the
observer is not known by the owner of the system
and thus is not measurable by the owner; and
 no system owner can know the totality of his
adversaries.
Other authors are less skeptical, advocating respective
developments [39] and even outlining a number of reasons
why measuring security is hard but feasible, including [40]:
 impossibility of testing all security requirements
 interactions between measurements and security
 changes in the environment imposed by adversaries
 subjectivity of the evaluators.
In addition, the same authors also offer some guidance,
which are mainly considerations on what should be included
in security measurement to make it “more accurate and
useful.” Among those suggestions several are worth
mentioning [40]: (a) building adequate models; (b) using a
set of metrics as opposed to a single metric; (b) use different
metrics for different purposes; (c) embrace uncertainty.
In the editorial introduction to the special issue of IEEE
Security and Privacy Magazine, on the Science of Security
[41], the guest editors also express skepticism about
measurability of security properties, and anticipate a rough
road to reaching this goal, saying that: “We’re a long way
from establishing a science of security comparable to the
traditional physical sciences, and even from knowing
whether such goal is even achievable.”
The same authors, in another article for this issue of IEEE
Security and Privacy [42], referring to “Lord Kelvin’s oftrepeated maxim,” argue that the essential issue in making
progress in security measurement is the existence and
usefulness of respective tools. They offer a tip to pursue
security metrics saying that two types of metrics can and
need to be pursued: “either analytical or experimental.”
As pointed out in the aforementioned editorial, we should
aim at making the security measurement process comparable
to those used in physical sciences. Let’s look, then, into the
ways the values of security can be assessed using scientific
methods, similar to those of measuring physical quantities.

JANUSZ ZALEWSKI ET AL.: MEASURING SECURITY

IV. MODEL FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT
A. Scientific Approaches to Measurement
Following the observation from [42], for assessment of
value of a system property, where there is no science or
theory developed, one could try conducting measurement
experiments. Nevertheless, if experimental assessment of a
system property quantitatively is impossible or difficult, one
can also apply simulation. As Glimm and Sharp, for
example, point out [43]: “It is an old saw that science has
three pillars: theory, experiment, and simulation.” This
principle is broadly applied in physics, the mother of
modern sciences, but it has been also adopted in various
ways in computing [44-45].
A closer look at selected computing disciplines reveals
that, knowingly or not, this principle has merit, for example,
in computer networks. Analytical modeling of network
traffic is usually done using queuing theory, measuring
network parameters, such as throughput and latency, is done
via experiments, and computer simulations use combined
computational models to accomplish what cannot be done
with theory or live experiments.
However, before any theory, experiment or simulation is
developed, putting cards on the table is necessary by
developing an initial model of the phenomena whose
properties are to be measured. This is the critical first step
to conduct the measurement.
B. General Modeling Objectives
Summarizing the discussion thus far, the critical elements
in measurements of any property are the following:
1) Clearly identify the property to be measured. It is at
this point where building a model of the phenomenon
is necessary. We use the term “property”, although in
measurement theory [46], it is called measurand.
2) Establish a metric to quantitatively characterize the
property.
Ideally, this would be a unit of
measurement, but for vaguely defined properties it can
be just a standard against which measurements are
applied, or a scale against which the property can be
evaluated.
3) Develop a measure, which would apply the metric to
related objects under investigation. Ideally, this is just
a measuring instrument, but for vaguely defined
metrics it can be a formula or any other mental device
to apply a metric. One important characteristic of a
measure should be its linearity, that is, any two
identical changes in the property value should be
reflected as two identical changes in the measure.
4) Design the measurement process to deliver results. An
important part of this process is calibration1 of the
1
The International Vocabulary of Metrology [46] defines calibration as
“operation that, under specified conditions, in a first step, establishes a
relation between the quantity values with measurement uncertainties
provided by measurement standards and corresponding indications with
associated measurement uncertainties and, in a second step, uses this
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measuring device [46], an activity almost never
thought of in soft sciences. Another crucial component
of this process is the collection and availability of data.
5) Make sure that each instance of a measurement
delivers a result composed of the value of the
measurement and the estimate of its accuracy (an
error). Alternatively, and consistently with current
views in measurement theory, it could be a rage of
values designating one value as “measured quantity
value” [46].
So knowing all this, now the question is, are we able to
develop a model for security measurement? It should
embrace all important factors regarding this phenomenon.
C. Architectural Model for Security Assessment
Various types of mathematical models exist to depict
physical and mental phenomena, all forming the basis of
modern science and engineering. Some of them are
continuous, for example, differential equations, but most of
those used in computing are discrete, such as queuing
theory, finite state machines, network and graph models
(Bayesian networks, Petri nets, Markov chains), rule-based
systems, etc., including what is called formal methods.
An interesting approach to modeling measurement
processes is presented in [9] and involves the IDEF0 process
notation specified in the Federal Information Processing
Standard [47]. This model is shown in Figure 2 and
includes the phenomenon being measured, shown as a
process, and the control unit representing an entity receiving
measurement results and taking respective actions. A
number of additional inputs to both the process and the
control unit are considered as well.

Fig. 2 Modeling of measurement activities according to [9]

We propose the adaptation of this model, making it closer
to those used in control theory, which can reflect an impact
of external circumstances on computer system’s security.
Taking the analogy with control engineering, one would
only keep interfaces relevant to security during system’s
operation and, as a result, derive a model of an embedded
information to establish a relation for obtaining a measurement result from
an indication.”
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controller (or more broadly, a cyberphysical system) subject
to security threats as shown in Figure 3.
The diagram shows that multiple controller interfaces to
the process, the operator, the network, and the database, are
all subject to security threats, forming the attack surface.
More importantly, to take the analogy further, just like
control theory assumes that the controlled process (a plant)
is subject to disturbances, security theory, if one is
developed for this model, could assume that known or
unknown threats play the role of disturbances to the
controller. While the control theory can make usually
realistic assumptions about the statistical nature of
disturbances (e.g., Gaussian noise), it would be challenging
– but not impossible – to try and develop a statistical model
for threats.

Fig. 3 Generic view of an embedded controller with security threats

In this model, vulnerabilities affecting the controller are
understood as an “asset or group of assets that can be
exploited by one or more threats” [48] or as a “weakness in
an information system, system security procedures, internal
controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a
threat source” [49], while a threat can be defined as “a state
of the system or system environment which can lead to
adverse effects” [50]. Consequently, the disturbances in
Figure 3 are an abstraction incorporating all threats relevant
to security and play a role in assessing security.
This is our generic model of a cyberphysical system
subject to security threats. It has internal vulnerabilities and
an attack surface composed of four interfaces. It is a
precondition to meet objective (1) from Section IV-B. Now
the question is how to define its security property?
D. Definition of the Term
From what has been written in general literature on
security measurements, cited earlier in this paper, it is not a
simple and unique property, which could be easily identified
and defined. Literature on cyberphysical systems is already
big and exponentially growing, but is relatively silent on the
issue of security measurement [51-52]. We are, therefore,
proposing our own approach, which is based on a
multifaceted view of security and its measurement.

Looking at definitions of security in established standard
glossaries, such as [49] or [53], it becomes immediately
clear that in none of these documents security is defined as a
system property. For example, one of several definitions in
[53] reads as follows: “Protection of information and data so
that unauthorized persons or systems cannot read or modify
them and authorized persons or systems are not denied
access to them” and a corresponding one in [49]: “A
condition that results from the establishment and
maintenance of protective measures that enable an enterprise
to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks
posed by threats to its use of information systems.”
These are both good definitions, but not for our purposes,
because they both refer to security as a state, as opposed to
ability. A definition of security as a system property must
imply that one wants to measure it. In this regard, just like
for several other properties, the definition should include a
phrase “the extent to which” or “the degree to which.”
Consequently, we propose adopting the definition of
security from [53], to read as follows:
security. The extent to which information and data
are protected so that unauthorized persons or
systems cannot read or modify them and
authorized persons or systems are not denied
access to them.
What is additionally important and captured well in [53] is
the fact that the secure system must be not only protected
against threats but also accessible to those authorized.
Having the definition in place, one needs to figure how to
assess “the extent” or “the degree” to which the conditions
spelled out in the definition are met? The community has
adopted several ways to do it. One view, which gained
especially wide popularity, is called C-I-A triad, where the
acronym comes from the first letters of, what are called,
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability [54]. The
assessment of the degree to which a system is secure is
based on meeting the three criteria of the C-I-A triad.
Another broadly adopted view to assess security is based
on the STRIDE threat model, which determines the security
of the system based on how well it is protected against the
following six specific threats: Spoofing Identity, Tampering
with Data, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of
Service, and Elevation of Privilege [55].
We tend to agree with these multifaceted views of
assessing security. To use a trivial comparison, measuring
security is like assessing patient’s health. It is necessary for
a doctor to look at more than one parameter to determine a
proper diagnosis or to discover a potential disease.
Analogically, from the security perspective, we are looking
for system health involving multiple indicators, not just one.
Additionally, we must take into account that security
situation changes over time [56], so the system is dynamical
and the security assessment must be continuous.
This merely concludes meeting objective (1) outlined in
Section IV-B and gives a background to meet objective (2).
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V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Outline of Establishing a Security Measurement Process
Thus far, we have determined the model for security
assessment for one particular class of systems, cyberphysical
systems, and defined security as a term. What is necessary
in the next step is developing the measurement process (with
metrics and measures) for measuring security in the
proposed context. This is, of course, an open question and a
tremendous challenge.
The model of Figure 3 forms the basis for building a case
study for security assessment, by analyzing threats and
vulnerabilities. The traditional way of determining and
investigating threats is done using attack trees, supported
with methods like STRIDE or DREAD as tools for general
security analysis [57-58]. In this paper, because of the need
for more quantitative approach, an alternative method is
suggested, based on assessing the vulnerabilities as per the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [59-60].
To recap what we are looking for, let’s repeat that items
(2)-(4) from Section IV-B have to be addressed: a metric,
which for CVSS is a continuous numerical scale; a measure,
which for CVSS is a set of integrated formulas; and the
measurement process, which in this case relies on applying
the measures to continuously collected data. With these
assumptions, the data can be obtained by online checking of
the subject entity (embedded device, server, cyberphysical
system, etc., for which security is being measured) for
known vulnerabilities, as per the Common Vulnerability
Exposure (CVE) database [61]. Then calculating the security
score based on the CVSS can be accomplished. Several
authors have proposed similar methodologies to use
CVE/CVSS data [62-63] for security measurement
purposes, although without actual theoretical underpinning.
The challenge is the unpredictable nature of threats. Even
if one can design countermeasures for existing threats and
assess those, there is high likelihood that new, unknown,
threats will appear, so one has to design the security system
for the unknown, as well as include this type of
unpredictability in the computational model for security
assessment.
The lack of sufficient information for
calculating security values suggests building a model based
on one of the theories, which deal with uncertainty, for
example Bayesian belief networks [64], Dempster-Shafer
theory [65], fuzzy sets [66] or rough sets [67].
B. Overview of a Case Study in Aviation
The aircraft internal networks tied with air traffic
management and airline operations bring security to the
forefront, because they may adversely affect flight safety.
This would fit in the model presented in Figure 3. However,
the existing aircraft system safety guidance does not address
airborne networks and data security issues.
Even though the RTCA committee on Aeronautical
Systems Security, SC-216, completed Airworthiness
Security Process Specification guidance, DO-326/ED202, in
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2010 [68], its work focuses on processes, methods and
considerations, staying away from engineering and scientific
approach based on measurements and analyses. Often the
terminology used in the documents contradicts that used by
scientific community. As an example, the aviation
community uses term “measures” to represent the
procedures, approaches, and tools used to mitigate the
security threat (which in common language are “mitigation
measures” or “countermeasures”).
There is an evident challenge to quantitatively
characterize the security properties. Nevertheless, there is a
significant practice, established in the safety domain, to use
a metric based on ranking applied on an ordinal scale. Clear
and unambiguous determination of the metric’s scale
categories (with assigned ranks) would allow developing
effective measures leading to modeling of security for
specific assets. However, the measurements would need to
be based on the developers' experience and collection of
well scrutinized historical data. The resulting measurement
(rank or category) would be representing the value, while
the accuracy is defined by the category boundaries. Just like
in the case described in previous subsection, due to the
subjective nature of assessment and lack of sufficient
information, it might be useful to explore the application of
theories dealing with uncertainty [64-67].
Security property is often assessed indirectly, in terms of
risk. Similar to the safety domain, where risk is defined as a
combination of probability of hazard and severity of the
potential consequences, the security domain also uses this
concept. The metrics used for assessing such security
aspects as attacker profile, vulnerabilities, operational
conditions, or threat conditions, are defined in terms of
likelihood (or probabilities). Again, these metrics are more
ordinal than numerical. Metrics such as likelihood of attack,
impact of a successful attack, level of exposure
(vulnerability), are very subjective, ill-defined, and
collecting data for them is an obvious challenge. The typical
categorization of the attack likelihood is presented below:
 Frequent – anticipated to occur routinely in the life
of each asset.
 Probable – unlikely to occur during a routine
operation but may occur a few times in the life of an
asset.
 Remote – unlikely to occur during its total life but
may occur several times in the total life of an entire
group of this type of assets.
 Extremely Remote – occurrence not anticipated
during its total life but may occur a few times in the
total life of entire group of this type of assets.
 Extremely Improbable – occurrence not anticipated
during the entire operational life of all assets of this
type.
The obvious question is what does it mean “routinely”,
“unlikely”, “not anticipated”? How much is “few” or
“several”? There is no agreement on specific numerical
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values and assessment of these likelihoods is difficult.
Similarly, typical categorization of a successful attack’s
impact or consequence is:
 Catastrophic – loss of system (occurrence of
multiple fatalities).
 Hazardous – large reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities (potential serious or fatal
injury).
 Major – significant reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities.
 Minor – slight reduction in safety margins or
functional capabilities.
 No Safety Effect – no impact on the operational
capability of the system.
Again, the questions are: what is “slight”, “significant” or
“large”?
Using similar categories we can classify vulnerability
level of the asset (e.g., highly vulnerable, vulnerable,
marginally vulnerable, not vulnerable) and the effectiveness
of the applied countermeasures (e.g., highly effective,
effective, marginally effective, not effective).
The current trend in aviation security [68] is to use the
term "characteristics" to denote "property" used in this
paper. The aviation community agrees on the following set
of parameters defining security property (S) under specific
operational conditions (indicated as O):
 A - likelihood of attack
 V - level of asset vulnerability
 E - effectiveness of applied countermeasures
 I - level of impact upon successful attack.
There has been little discussion on how these parameters
should be measured, less even what models are reflecting
their interrelations. Considering the discrete and ordinal
nature of the above parameters, there is a possibility to
create mathematical model of security S in a form of a
discrete function:
S = f(A, V, E, I, O)
Evidently, higher ranks of parameters A, V, and I would
have a negative impact and thus decrease the security value,
while higher rank of parameter E would have positive
impact on security as the system property. Based on
historical data and actual assessment of security an attempt
can be made to identify the f() function.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a view on addressing an enormous
challenge of measuring computer security as a system
property. Guided by principles of measurements introduced
in the 19-th century by Hermann von Helmholtz, as well as
by the statistical nature of measurements, and facing some
fundamental questions whether security is a measurable
property, a high-level model for security assessment is
proposed. This model is built exploiting an analogy with a
control system, treating threats as disturbances to the

controller. The proposed model requires identifying
measured property, establish appropriate metric, developing
measure and the measurement process, and finally present
the results in form of a value with an associated accuracy.
This model can be only as good as the data set to which it
can be applied. With a chronic lack of reliable data related
to security threats and vulnerabilities, it is proposed to use
the National Vulnerability Database [61] and apply to it the
Common Vulnerability Scoring Systems (CVSS) [59-60], to
derive security assessment using computational methods
dealing with uncertainty. Comparing the process of security
assessment to the development of measurement standards
and processes for physical quantities, such as length or time,
it is anticipated that refining and adjusting the concepts of
computer security assessment may take decades and in fact
is a challenge for the entire generation.
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